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Paul Romer’s paper, “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,”
is now fifteen years old. This pathbreaking contribution led to a resur-
gence in research on economic growth. The resulting literature has
had a number of important impacts. In particular, it shifted the re-
search focus of macroeconomists. From the time when Lucas, Barro,
Prescott, and Sargent led the rational expectations revolution until
Romer, Barro, and Lucas started the new literature on economic growth,
macroeconomists devoted virtually no effort to the study of long-run
issues; they were all doing research on business cycle theory. In this
sense, the new growth theory represented a step in the right direction.
The new growth literature has had a similar impact on macroeco-
nomics classes and textbooks. Until 1986, most macroeconomics classes
and textbooks either relegated economic growth to a marginal role or
neglected it altogether. Things are very different now. Modern under-
graduate textbooks devote more than a third of their space to economic
growth, and both graduate and undergraduate macroeconomics classes
devote a substantial amount of time to this important subject. The
impact of these two changes on the training of young economists is
very important, and this should be viewed as another contribution of
the new economic growth literature.
The contributions I wish to highlight in this conference, however,
are the substantial ones: I want to discuss the most significant ways in
which the new economic growth literature has expanded our under-
standing of economics.
I thank Laila Haider for her comments.
Economic Growth: Sources, Trends, and Cycles, edited by Norman Loayza
and Raimundo Soto, Santiago, Chile. © 2002 Central Bank of Chile.42 Xavier Sala-i-Martin
1. THE EMPIRICAL TOUCH
One of the key differences between the current and the old litera-
ture is that this time around, growth economists address empirical
issues much more seriously. This has led to the creation of a number of
extremely useful data sets. The Summers and Heston data set tops the
list. Summers and Heston (1988, 1991) construct national accounts
data for a large cross-section of countries for a substantial period of
time (for some countries the data start in 1950; for most countries they
start in 1960). In principle, the data are adjusted for differences in
purchasing power across countries, which allows for strict comparabil-
ity of levels of gross domestic product (GDP) at a given point in time.
Even though some researchers have complained about the quality of
this data set, overall it represents one of the main contributions of this
literature because it allows researchers to confront their theories with
actual data. This was not true the last time growth economics was a
popular area of research in the 1960s (perhaps because they did not
have access to the data that we have today).
The Summers-Heston data set is not the only data set that has
been created recently. Barro and Lee (1993), for example, also construct
a large number of variables, mainly related to education and human
capital. This is especially important because the first generation of
endogenous growth theories emphasize the role of human capital as the
main (or at least one of the main) engines of growth. Other recently
constructed data sets include social and political variables that are es-
pecially useful for one of the newest lines of research, which empha-
sizes institutions (see, for example, Knack and Keefer, 1995; Deininger
and Squire, 1996).
1.1 Better Relation between Theory and Empirics
A second important innovation of the new growth literature is that
it has brought empirical studies closer to the predictions of economic
theory. The neoclassical literature of the 1960s links theory and evi-
dence by simply mentioning a number of stylized facts (such as the
Kaldor “facts”) and showing that the theory being proposed is consis-
tent with one, two, or perhaps several of these so-called facts.1
1. Some of these facts, including the Kaldor facts, did not really come from
careful empirical analysis, but they were quoted and used as if they were widely
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Today’s research, on the other hand, tends to derive more precise
econometric specifications, and these relationships are taken to the data.
The best example can be found in the convergence literature. Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1992) use the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans growth model
(Ramsey, 1928; Cass, 1975; Koopmans, 1965) to derive an econometric
equation that relates the growth of Per capita GDP to the initial level
of GDP. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) derive a similar equation
from the Solow-Swan model (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956). These research-
ers derive a relationship of the form
bb gb e lnln
*
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where gi,t,t+T is the growth rate of per capita GDP for country i be-
tween time t and time t + T, yit is per capita GDP for country i at time
t, and yi* is the steady-state value of per capita GDP for country i.
The term eit is an error term. The coefficient is positive if the produc-
tion function is neoclassical, and it is zero if the production function
is linear in capital (which is usually the case in the first generation
one-sector models of endogenous growth, also known as AK models).2
In particular, if the production function is Cobb-Douglas with a capi-
tal share given by a then, the parameter b (also known as the speed of
convergence) is given by b = (1 – a) (d + n), where d is the deprecia-
tion rate and n is the exogenous rate of population growth.3 (Notice
that when a = 1, which corresponds to the AK model, the speed of
convergence is b = 0.)
My main point is that the modern literature took equation 1 as a
serious prediction of the theory and used it to test the new models of
endogenous growth (the AK models, which predict b = 0) against the
old neoclassical models (which predict b > 0.) Initially, some research-
ers mistakenly took equation 1 to suggest that neoclassical theory pre-
dicted absolute convergence. In other words, if b > 0 (that is, if the
world is best described by the neoclassical model), then poor countries
should be growing faster than others. People therefore started running
regressions of the type
,, ˆˆ ln, it ittT0 it bb  +  y + g=- w (2)
2. Paul Romer’s seminal paper (Romer, 1986) is an example of an AK model.
See also Rebelo (1991); Jones and Manuelli (1990); Barro (1990).
3. The derivation of this equation assumes constant savings rates à la Solow-
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and tested whether the coefficient  ˆ b was positive. Notice that if  ˆ b>0,
then poor countries grow faster than rich ones, such that there is con-
vergence across countries. On the other hand, if  ˆ b=0, then the growth
rate and the level of income are not related, and the neoclassical model
was rejected in favor of the AK model of endogenous growth. The main
empirical results found were that the estimated  ˆ b was not significantly
different from zero. This was thought to be good news for the new theo-
ries of endogenous growth and bad news for the neoclassical model.
Researchers quickly realized, however, that this conclusion is erro-
neous. Regressions of the form of equation 2 implicitly assume that all
countries approach the same steady state, or at least that the steady-
state is not correlated with the level of income. If yi* = y* in equation 1,
then this term gets absorbed by the constant  ˆ0 b in equation 2 and dis-
appears from the regression. The problem is that if researchers as-
sume that countries converge to the same steady state when, in fact,
they don’t, then equation 2 is misspecified and the error term becomes
wit = eit + lnyi*. If the steady state is correlated with the initial level of
income, then the error term is correlated with the explanatory vari-
able, which biases the estimated coefficient toward zero. In other words,
the early finding that there is no positive association between growth
and the initial level of income could be a statistical artifact resulting
from the misspecification of equation 2.
Researchers proposed various solutions to this problem, such as
considering data in which the initial level of income is not correlated
with the steady-state level of income. Many researchers therefore started
using regional data sets (like states within the United States, prefec-
tures within Japan, or regions within European, Latin American, and
other Asian countries).4
Another solution is to use cross-country data but—instead of esti-
mating the univariate regression as in equation 2—to estimate a mul-
tivariate regression in which, on top of the initial level of income, the
researcher also holds constant proxies for the steady state. This came
to be known as conditional convergence. Further research shows that
the conditional convergence hypothesis is one of the strongest and
most robust empirical regularities found in the data. Hence, by tak-
ing the theory seriously, researchers arrived at the exact opposite
empirical conclusion: the neoclassical model is not rejected by the
data, whereas the AK model is.
4. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992; 1998, chaps. 10–12).45 Fifteen Years of New Growth Economics
My reason for highlighting these results is not to emphasize the
concepts of convergence or conditional convergence. Rather, my point
is that the new growth economists took the theory seriously when they
took it to the data. This was a substantial improvement over the previ-
ous round of economic growth research.
1.2 Models That Are Consistent with Convergence
The results from the convergence literature are interesting for a
variety of reasons. Most importantly, the literature finds that condi-
tional convergence is a strong empirical regularity, indicating that the
data are consistent with the neoclassical theory based on diminishing
returns. This was the initial and most widespread interpretation. These
empirical results also mean that the simple closed-economy, one-sector
model of endogenous growth (the AK model) is easily rejected by the
data. However, more sophisticated models of endogenous growth that
display transitional dynamics are also consistent with the convergence
evidence.5 For example, the two-sector models of endogenous growth
proposed by Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988) were later shown to be
consistent with this evidence. AK models of technological diffusion (where
the A flows slowly from rich countries to poor countries) also tend to
make similar predictions.
1.3 Other Findings from the Convergence Literature
The first reason for studying convergence is to test theories. A sec-
ond reason is to discover whether the world is such that the standard of
living of the poor tends to improve more rapidly than that of the rich or
whether the rich get richer while the poor become poorer. In dealing
with these questions, perhaps the concept of conditional convergence is
not as interesting as the concept of absolute convergence. Another rel-
evant concept is that of s-convergence, which looks at the level of in-
equality across countries (measured, for example, as the variance of
the log of per capita GDP) and checks whether this level increases over
time. The key result here is that inequality across countries tends to
increase over time.6
5. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1998, chaps. 6 and 8).
6. This led Lance Pritchett to write a paper entitled “Divergence Big Time.”
The title is self-explanatory.46 Xavier Sala-i-Martin
This analysis has recently come under criticism from two fronts.
The first is the so-called Twin Peaks literature led by Danny Quah
(1996, 1997). These researchers are interested in the evolution of the
world distribution of income, and the variance is only one aspect of this
distribution. Quah notices that in 1960, the world distribution of in-
come was unimodal, whereas it became bimodal in the 1990s,. He then
uses Markov transitional matrices to estimate the probabilities that
countries improve their position in the world distribution and to fore-
cast the evolution of this distribution over time. He concludes that in
the long run, the distribution will remain bimodal, although the lower
mode will include a lot fewer countries than the upper mode.
Although Quah’s papers triggered a large body of research, his con-
clusion does not appear to be very robust. Jones (1997) and Kremer,
Onatski, and Stock (2001) show that a lot of these results depend cru-
cially on whether the data set includes oil-producing countries. For
example, the exclusion of Trinidad and Tobago or Venezuela from the
sample changes the prediction of a bimodal steady-state distribution to
a unimodal distribution: because these two countries were once rela-
tively rich but have now become poor, excluding them from the sample
substantially lowers the probability that a country will move down in
the distribution.
The second line of criticism comes from researchers who claim that
the unit of analysis should not be a country. Countries are useful units
for testing theories because many of the policies or institutions consid-
ered by the theories are countrywide. But if the question is whether
poor people’s standard of living improves more rapidly than rich people’s,
then the correct unit may be a person rather than a country. In this
sense, the evolution of per capita income in China is more important
than the evolution of per capita income in Lesotho, because China has
a lot more people. In fact, China has almost twice as many citizens as
all African countries combined, even though Africa has around 35 inde-
pendent states. A better measure of the evolution of personal inequal-
ity, therefore, is the population-weighted variance of the log of per capita
income (as opposed to the simple variance of the log of per capita in-
come, which gives the same weight to all countries, regardless of popu-
lation). The striking result is that the weighted variance does not in-
crease monotonically over time. As shown by Schultz (1998) and Dowrick
and Akmal (2001), the weighted variance increases for most of the 1960s
and 1970s, but it peaks in 1978. After that, the weighted variance de-
clines, rooted in the fact that China, with 20 percent of the world’s
population, has experienced large increases in per capita income. This47 Fifteen Years of New Growth Economics
effect was reinforced in the 1990s when India (with another billion in-
habitants) started its process of rapid growth.
Population-weighted variance analysis assumes that each person
within a country has the same level of income, while some countries have
more people than others.7 This obviously ignores the fact that inequality
within countries may increase over time. In particular, it has been claimed
that inequality within China and India increased tremendously after 1980,
which may more than offset the process of convergence of the per capita
income of these two countries to that of the United States.
1.4 Cross-Country Growth Regressions
Another important line of research in the empirical literature fol-
lows Barro (1991) in using cross-country regressions to find the empiri-
cal determinants of the growth rate of an economy:8
b g w it it i,t,t+T =  +  , X (3)
where Xit is a vector of variables thought to reflect determinants of long-
term growth. In the context of the theory that predicts equation 1, if one of
the variables in the vector X reflects the initial level of income, then the
rest of the variables can be thought of as proxies for the steady-state, lnyi*.
The cross-country regression literature is enormous. A large num-
ber of papers claim to have found one or more variables that are par-
tially correlated with the growth rate: from human capital to invest-
ment in research and development (R&D), to policy variables such as
inflation or the fiscal deficit, to the degree of openness, to financial
variables, to measures of political instability. In fact, the number of
variables claimed to be correlated with growth is so large that it raises
the question of which of these variables are actually robust.9
Some important lessons from this literature include the following:
—There is no simple determinant of growth.
—The initial level of income is the most important and robust
variable (so conditional convergence is the most robust empirical fact
in the data).
7. The unweighted analysis assumes that each person has the same income
and that all countries have the same population.
8. For surveys of the literature, see Durlauf and Quah (1999); Temple (1999).
9. See the work of Levine and Renelt (1992) and, more recently, Sala-i-
Martin, Doppelhoffer and Miller (2001) for some analysis of robustness in cross-
country growth regressions.48 Xavier Sala-i-Martin
—The size of the government does not appear to matter much,
whereas the quality of government does. (For example, governments
that produce hyperinflation, distortions in foreign exchange markets,
extreme deficits, or inefficient bureaucracies are detrimental to an
economy.)
—The relation between most measures of human capital and growth
is weak, although some measures of health (such as life expectancy)
are robustly correlated with growth.
—Institutions (such as free markets, property rights, and the rule
of law) are important for growth.
—More open economies tend to grow faster.
2. TECHNOLOGY, INCREASING RETURNS, AND IMPERFECT
COMPETITION
If one important set of contributions of the economic growth litera-
ture is empirical, another is theoretical: the endogenization of techno-
logical progress. The main physical characteristic of technology is that
it is a nonrival good. This means that the same formula, the same
blueprint may be used by many people simultaneously. This concept
should be distinguished from that of nonexcludability. A good is exclud-
able if its use can be prevented.
Romer (1993) provides a simple matrix that helps clarify the is-
sues. The first column in the matrix shows rival goods, while the sec-
ond displays nonrival goods. The three rows are ordered by the degree
of excludability: goods in the upper rows are more excludable than goods
in the lower rows.10 In the upper left corner, for example, cookies are
categorized as both rival and excludable. They are rival goods because
when someone eats a cookie, no one else can eat it at the same time.
They are excludable because the owner of the cookies can prevent any-
one else from using them unless they pay for them.
Rival Nonrival
More excludable Cookies Cable television signal
Intermediate excludable Software
Less excludable Fish in the sea Pythagorean theorem
10. The concept of rivalry is a discrete or 0–1 concept (goods can either be
used by more than one user or they cannot). The concept of excludability is more
continuous.49 Fifteen Years of New Growth Economics
The bottom row of column one lists fish in the sea. The fish are
rival because if someone catches a fish, no one else can catch it. The
fish are nonexcludable, however, because it is virtually impossible to
prevent people from going out to the sea to catch fish. The goods in this
box (rival and nonexcludable) are said to be subject to the tragedy of the
commons. This term comes from medieval times, when the land sur-
rounding cities was common land used for pasture; this meant that
everyone could take their cows to pasture in the fields. The grass that
a person’s cow ate could not be eaten by other cows, so it was rival. Yet
the law of the land allowed everyone’s cows to pasture, so the grass was
nonexcludable. The result was, of course, that the city overexploited
the land and everyone ended up without grass, which was a tragedy.
Hence the name.
These two types of goods are important, but they are not the goods
that I want to discuss here. The second column—nonrival goods—is
the relevant one. In the top box, a cable television signal, such as HBO,
is nonrival in the sense that many people can watch HBO simulta-
neously. It is excludable, however, because the owners can prevent
anyone from seeing HBO if they don’t pay the monthly fee. In the bot-
tom box, basic knowledge is represented by the Pythagorean theorem:
many people can use it at the same time so it is a nonrival piece of
knowledge, but the formula is also nonexcludable since it is impossible
for anyone to prevent its use.
The middle box contains technological goods that are nonrival and
partially excludable. This category includes goods such as computer
software. Many people can use Microsoft Word at the same time, so the
codes that make this popular program are clearly nonrival. In prin-
ciple, people cannot use the program unless they pay a fee to Microsoft,
but in practice, people frequently install a copy of the program that a
friend or relative bought, and it is very hard to prevent this from hap-
pening. It is thus not fully excludable. This is why it occupies an inter-
mediate position.
Whether a good is more or less excludable depends not only on its
physical nature, but also on the legal system. The economic historian
and Nobel Prize winner, Douglas North, argued that the industrial revo-
lution occurred in England in the 1760s precisely because it was then
and there that the institutions to protect intellectual property rights
were created. Intellectual property rights are a way to move technologi-
cal goods up the excludability ladder in column 2. The existence of such
institutions that make goods excludable allow inventors to charge for
and profit from their inventions, which provides incentives to do research.50 Xavier Sala-i-Martin
2.1 Modeling Technological Progress
The old neoclassical literature points out that the long-run growth
rate of the economy is determined by the growth rate of technology.
The problem is that it is impossible to model technological progress
within a neoclassical framework in which perfectly competitive price-
taking firms have access to production functions with constant returns
to scale in capital and labor. The argument goes as follows. Since tech-
nology is nonrival, a firm should be able to double its size by simply
replicating itself—creating a new plant with exactly the same inputs.
The firm would need to double capital and labor, but it could use the
same technology in both places. This means that the concept of con-
stant returns to scale should apply to capital and labor only. That is,
lll F(K,L,A) = F(K,L,A), (4)
where A is the level of technology, K is capital, and L is labor.
Euler’s theorem says that
tKL  = K + L YFF . (5)
Perfectly competitive neoclassical firms pay rental prices that are
equal to marginal products. Thus,
ttt tt  =  +  Rw YKL . (6)
In other words, once the firm has paid for its inputs, the total out-
put is exhausted. The firm therefore cannot devote resources to im-
proving technology. It follows that if technological progress exists, it
must be exogenous to the model in the sense that R&D cannot be in-
duced and financed by neoclassical firms.
Since technology is nonrival, it must be produced only once (be-
cause once it is produced, many people can use it over and over). This
suggests that a large fixed cost (the R&D cost) is associated with its
production, which leads to the notion of increasing returns. The aver-
age cost of producing technology is always larger than the marginal
cost. Under perfect price competition (a competition that leads to the
equalization of prices with marginal costs), the producers of technology
who pay the fixed R&D costs will always lose money. The implication is
that no firm will engage in research in a perfectly competitive environ-
ment. Put another way, endogenously modeling technological progress51 Fifteen Years of New Growth Economics
requires abandoning the perfectly competitive, Pareto-optimal world
that is the foundation of neoclassical theory and allowing for imperfect
competition.11 Therein lies another contribution of the literature: un-
like the neoclassical researchers of the 1960s, today’s economists deal
with models that are not Pareto optimal.
Romer (1990) introduced these concepts in a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
model in which innovation took the form of new varieties of products.
Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998) extended the theory to a Schumpeterian
framework in which firms devote R&D resources to improving the qual-
ity of existing products. The quality ladder framework differs from the
product variety framework in that the improvement of the quality of a
product tends to make the previous generation of products obsolete.
This leads to the Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction, by which
firms create new ideas in order to destroy the profits of the firms that
had the old ideas (Schumpeter, [1942] 1975).
The new growth models of technological progress have clarified
some important issues when it comes to R&D policies, perhaps the
most important being that despite market failures (caused by imper-
fect competition, externalities, and increasing returns), it is not at all
obvious whether the government should intervene, what this poten-
tial intervention should look like, and, in particular, whether it should
involve R&D subsidies. This is important given the widespread popu-
lar notion that countries tend to underinvest in technology and that
the government should do something about it. The R&D models high-
light a number of distortions, but subsidizing R&D is not necessarily
the best way to deal with them. For example, the one distortion that
is common across models is that arising from imperfect competition:
prices tend to be above marginal cost and the quantity of ideas gener-
ated tend to be below optimal. The optimal policy to offset this distor-
tion, however, is not an R&D subsidy, but rather a subsidy for the
purchase of the overpriced goods.
A second distortion may arise from the externalities within the
structure of R&D costs. If the invention of a new product affects the
cost of invention of the new generation of products, then there is a role
for market intervention. The problem is that it is not clear whether a
new invention will increase or decrease the cost of future inventions:
while it can persuasively be argued that the cost of R&D declines with
11. The path-breaking paper by Romer (1986) uses an alternative trick to get
around the problem: it assumes that firms do not engage in purposefully financed
R&D. Instead, knowledge is generated as a side product of investment. This line of
research, however, was quickly abandoned.52 Xavier Sala-i-Martin
the number of things that have already been invented (following Newton’s
idea of shoulders of giants), it can also be argued that easy inventions
are pursued first, such that R&D costs increase with the number of
inventions. If the cost declines, then firms doing R&D tend not to inter-
nalize all the benefits of their inventions (in particular, they do not
take into account the fact that future researchers will benefit by the
decline in R&D costs), so they tend to underinvest in R&D. In this
case, the correct policy is an R&D subsidy. If the costs increase with
the number of inventions, however, then current researchers exert a
negative externality on future researchers and they tend to overinvest.
The required policy becomes an R&D tax rather than an R&D subsidy.
The Schumpeterian approach brings in additional distortions, be-
cause current researchers tend to exert a negative effect on past re-
searchers through the process of creative destruction. These effects tend
to call for taxes on R&D (rather than subsidies), as current research-
ers tend to perform too much, not too little, R&D. Finally, government
intervention is not required at all if the firm doing current research is
the technological leader. For example, Intel owns the Pentium II and
performs research to create the Pentium III and then the Pentium IV,
thereby destroying the profits generated by its past investments. When
the new inventor is also the technological leader, the inventor will tend
to internalize the losses of current research on past researchers, so no
government intervention is called for.
Although the new generation of growth models is based on strong
departures from the old Pareto-optimal neoclassical world, the models
do not necessarily call for strong government intervention, and when
they do, the recommended intervention may not coincide with the popu-
lar view that R&D needs to be subsidized.
2.2 Markets for Vaccines
An influential idea that has come out of the economic growth litera-
ture is Michael Kremer’s recommendation to create a market for vac-
cines to help solve the new African pandemics of AIDS and malaria
(Kremer, 2000). Kremer emphasizes that financing public research is
not the best way to provide incentives for R&D related to diseases that
mainly affect the poor. Rather, the best solution is to create a fund with
public money (donated by rich governments and rich private philanthro-
pists). This fund would not be used to finance research directly, but to
purchase vaccines from the inventor. The price paid would be above
marginal cost, which would provide incentives for pharmaceutical53 Fifteen Years of New Growth Economics
companies to devote resources to investigating and developing vaccines
against malaria and AIDS, which is something they do not currently do.
3. MERGING ECONOMIC LITERATURES
Another important contribution of the new economic growth litera-
ture is that it has exerted some influence on other economic literatures
and, in turn, has benefited from them. One of the most prominent
examples of this symbiosis is the discipline’s interaction with the new
development literature, which traditionally was largely institutional
and centered around economic planning. Growth economists who used
to rely almost exclusively on Pareto-optimal, complete-market, perfectly
competitive neoclassical models now systematically abandon their tra-
ditional paradigms, and they discuss the role of institutions without
thinking they are doing second-rate research. At the same time, devel-
opment economists have learned the value of incorporating general equi-
librium and macroeconomic features into their traditional models.
This kind of cross-discipline interaction with growth economics
can also be observed in other fields such as economic geography (see
Krugman, 1991; Matsuyama, 1991; Fujita, Krugman, and Venables,
1999), macroeconomics and trade theory (Grossman and Helpman,
1991), industrial organization (Aghion and Howitt, 1992, 1998; Peretto,
1998), public finance (Barro, 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1998),
econometrics (Quah, 1993; Durlauf and Quah, 1999; Sala-i-Martin,
Doppelhoffer, and Miller, 2001), and economic history and demogra-
phy (Kremer, 1993; Hansen and Prescott, 1998; Jones, 1999; Lucas,
1999; Galor and Weil, 1998).12
4. INSTITUTIONS
Another important lesson to be learned from the new economic
growth literature is that institutions are important empirically, and
they can be modeled. By institutions, I mean various aspects of law
12. Following the influential paper by Kremer (1993), a number of researchers
attempt to model the history of the world over the last million years with a single
model that explains the millennia-long periods of stagnation, the industrial revolution
and the subsequent increase in the rate of economic growth, and the demographic
transition that led families to become smaller, which allowed them to increase their
per capita income. This literature has made use of long-term data (and I mean really
long-term data, dating back to 1 million B.C.). The insights from these historical
analyses are perhaps another interesting contribution of the growth literature.54 Xavier Sala-i-Martin
enforcement (property rights, the rule of law, legal systems, peace), the
functioning of markets (market structures, competition policy, open-
ness to foreign markets, capital and technology), political institutions
(democracy, political freedom, political disruption, political stability),
the health system (as previously mentioned, life expectancy is one of
the variables most robustly correlated with growth), financial institu-
tions (an efficient banking system, a good stock market), government
institutions (the size of the bureaucracy, the extent of red tape, govern-
ment corruption), and inequality and social conflicts,13.
Institutions affect the efficiency of an economy much in the same
way as technology does: an economy with bad institutions is more ineffi-
cient, in the sense that it takes more inputs to produce the same amount
of output. In addition, bad institutions lower incentives to invest (in physi-
cal and human capital as well as technology) and to work and produce.
Despite their similar effects on the economy, however, the promotion or
introduction of good institutions differs substantially from the promotion
of new technologies. In fact, it is hard to develop new and better technolo-
gies in an economy that does not have the right institutions.
Although the new economic growth literature has quantified the im-
portance of having the right institutions, it is still in the early stages
when it comes to understanding how to promote them in practice. For
example, the empirical level-of-income literature mentioned above demon-
strates that the institutions left behind in liberated colonies directly affect
the level of income enjoyed by the country one half century later: colonies
in which the colonizers introduced institutions that helped them live a
better life in the colony tend to have more income today than colonies in
which the colonizers introduced predatory institutions. This seems to be a
robust empirical phenomenon. The lessons for the future are not clear,
however. Is it possible to undo the harm done by the colonial predators? If
so, what sort of actions would be effective, and how should they be imple-
mented? Although these important questions are currently being addressed
in the literature, the answers are still unclear.
Indeed, the process of incorporating institutions into growth theo-
ries is itself still in the early stages. Empirically, however, it is be-
coming increasingly clear that institutions are an important deter-
minant of growth.14
13. The relation between inequality and growth has been widely studied. See
Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Peñalosa (1999); Barro (1999a); Perotti (1996).
14. Excellent examples include the recent of work of Hall and Jones (1999);
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000); McArthur and Sachs (2001).55 Fifteen Years of New Growth Economics
5. CONCLUSIONS
The recent economic growth literature has produced a number of
important insights at both the theoretical and empirical levels. This
paper has analyzed some of the most salient. Although this might seem
as pessimistic, let me close with a confession of ignorance. Economists
have learned a lot about growth in the last few years, but we still do not
seem to understand why Africa turned out to have such a dismal growth
performance. The welfare of an entire continent—with close to 700
million citizens—has deteriorated dramatically since independence, and
the main reason is that the countries in which these people live have
failed to grow. Understanding the underlying reasons for this gargan-
tuan failure is the most important question the economics profession
faces as we enter the new century.56 Xavier Sala-i-Martin
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